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Abstract
By using theoretical model and empirical analysis, we investigate how economic
integration affects the impact of the profit sharing on the employment. We show that, in
theory, the effects of economic integration on the impact of profit sharing on employment
depend definitely trade-off between intensified competition and better advantage of
economies of scale. If product market competition increases, the possibilities of profit
sharing to improve employment through economic integration increase with moderated
wages. While, the economic integration associating with market power in turn decreases
the possibilities of profit sharing with higher wages to improve employment. As increased
trade competition crowds out better advantage of economies of scale, economic
integration increases profit sharing with wage-moderating and thus improve labour
demand. We test the idea whether European integration has changed the impact of the
profit sharing on the employment in Finland using data from the manufacturing sector from
1996 to 2004. The results show that profit-sharing has positive impact on employment in
the process of economic integration, but can have ambiguous effects on the stability of
employment.
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1  INTRODUCTION
The earliest arguments for gains from economic integration are based on that interna-
tional competition promotes economic efficiency. The protection of market is costly
because resources are not allocated in areas where a country has a comparative advan-
tage. Bernard et al. (2006) find that economic activity is reallocated towards high-
productivity firms as trade costs fall in industry. The benefits of economic integration
result from access to larger markets, and therefore larger profits and possible economies
of scale. The recent emphasis on imperfectly competitive markets in international trade
creates another argument for gains from integration: in a protected market dominated by
only a few firms, trade reform increases competition which is also important for produc-
tive efficiency. Research on productivity often examines the relationship between pro-
ductivity increases and structural changes in an economy, such as trade policy reforms.
According to recent heterogeneous firm models (see for example Helpman et al. 2003,
or Bernard et al. 2003) the benefits of trade are accrue to the most productive firms
within industry, whereas the costs are felt disproportionately by the least productive.
Bayoumi et al. (2004) conclude that greater competition significantly stimulates macro-
economic performance and that it may improve macroeconomic management by in-
creasing the responsiveness of wages and prices to market conditions.  In line with this
view intensified competition in product markets could be expected to affect on the im-
pact of profit sharing on employment. The relationship between profit-sharing and
firm's performance has been addressed in several empirical studies (see Fitzroy and
Kraft 1987, Cable and Wilson 1989 and 1990, Wadhwani and Wall 1990, Kruse 1992,
Cahuc and Dormont 1997, Conyon and Freeman 2001). All of these studies show that
profit-sharing is correlated with a better productivity. This implies that employment
might be higher in profit-sharing firms through the productivity effects of economic
integration. Gersbach (2000) argues that reductions in product market imperfections
might enhance employment through lower mark-ups, higher total productivity and ex-
panded sets of product varieties. If, however, it is supposed that economic integration
only strengthens the price competition, then the productivity changes associated with
2trade reform may be mismeasured. Then, the impact of liberalization on product market
leads to biased estimates of the relationship between trade reform and productivity
growth. This suggests that it has to be taken account for changes in both of price-cost
margins and returns to scale as the measures of competition estimating the effects of
economic integration on the impact of profit sharing on employment.
There is also the issue of employment stability. One of the concerns is how changes
in the degree of product market competition can affect labour practices in the progress
of integration where firms face aggregate and industry-specific shocks. Economic inte-
gration is a process in which markets for goods and factors of production tend to be-
come perfectly integrated. The mobility of production has been increasing as a conse-
quence of product market integration. As Rodrik (1998, 1999) argues, open economies,
which are free to trade with each other, differ from closed economies in the respect that
in particular capital and employers are internationally mobile. The progress of integra-
tion with the wider trade and capital flows has been strengthening the competition both
within and across industries and countries, which has reflected in the labour market.
Product demand will become more sensitive to price differentials between economies
and firms’ location decisions more responsive to relative labour costs. Rodrik (1997,
1998) explains when the shock of product market is a negative one; there is a larger
decrease in employment in the more open economy than there is in the more closed
economy. A consequence of integration is greater instability in labour-market outcomes
when openness magnifies the effects of shocks on labour demand. On the other hand,
the firms with access to the wider market were expected to be able to expand sales and
production to take better advantage of economies of scale while continuing to cover
production costs despite lower price-cost margins. This implies that the creative destruc-
tion of exporting is associated with the reallocation of resources from less efficient to
more efficient firms which may generate more job creation than job destruction. The
impact of profit sharing on the changes of net employment refers here to profit sharing
as method of payment based on performance of firms, as opposed to base wage. The
loss of national adjustment variables with the progress of integration will result in an
increased need for alternative flexible mechanisms to correct possible asymmetric
shocks across industries and countries. Therefore, competitiveness pressure on the la-
bour market towards greater flexibility is expected to increase under diminishing trade
3barriers. Haffner et al. (2000) find evidence that both product market competition and
labour market flexibility have been fostered by integration within the EU-countries.
Weitzman (1985, 1987) has argued that the merit of profit-sharing is that it guarantees
stability of employment in the face of shocks. The theoretical arguments rely crucially
on the assumption that firms use the base wage and not the total level of remuneration
as the relevant marginal cost of labour. A wage system has a negative macroeconomic
externality, while a profit-sharing system has favourable externality effects on employ-
ment and, indirectly, on price stability. It is argued that, if there is a general rise in
product market competition, the loss of rents would be shared by the firms and workers
with no overall impact on employment (see Geroski et al., 1995, for example). Kruse
(1991) presents evidence suggesting that the statistical association between aggregate
unemployment and employment at the firm level is less strong for profit-sharing firms.
However, Wadhwani and Wall (1990) present a more formal test of this proposition in
the context of a labour demand model, and find no difference in the effect of aggregate
demand shocks on employment between profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing firms.
Profit sharing has been extensively used in European countries as part of the com-
pensation scheme in the labour market.  Pendleton et al. (2001) presents detailed data on
the significant proportion of workplaces with financial employee participation, in par-
ticular in the form of profit sharing schemes, in EU-countries. Profit sharing has in-
creased considerably in Finland during the late 1990s.  Profit sharing has been seen as a
way to introduce wage flexibility in a setting where wage levels are determined central-
ized, as in case of Finland. We consider the hypothesis that profit sharing is introduced
not as an incentive mechanism, but as a way to obtain a more stable employment in the
process of economic integration. The purpose of this study is to examine by using theo-
retical model and empirical analysis the effects of economic integration on the impact of
profit sharing on employment. The commitment to profit sharing serves as a strategic
device inducing a reduction in the negotiated base wage, thereby generating a link be-
tween the imperfections in the product market and equilibrium employment. In theory,
the impact of profit sharing on employment with economic integration depend definitely
on trade-off between intensified competition and better advantage of economies of
scale. A comparatively high degree of product market competition will make labour
demand more elastic and shift it outwards. Due to rent sharing behaviour, wage rates
4can be expected to be inversely related to product market competition. Hence, it can be
argued that the possibilities of profit sharing to improve employment through economic
integration is progressively increased when product market competition increases.
However, there is case in which firms might choose to pay higher wages when they
have market power and are earning higher monopoly rents. With increased integration
and competition firms with access to the wider market are expected to be able to expand
sales and production to take better advantage of economies of scale. Thus, market
power may arise from specialization in production and differentiation of products to
establish segmented markets. The economic integration associating with market power
might in turn decrease the possibilities of profit sharing with higher wages to improve
employment. As a consequence, the validity of the relationship has to be determined
empirically. We focus on the empirical work with the aim of determining the effect of
European integration on the impact of profit sharing on the employment. The question
about the relationship between the intensity of economic integration and employment in
the presence of profit sharing has not been studied empirically. This has been tested
using data from the Finnish manufacturing sector from 1996 to 2004.
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on identifying the main chan-
nels through which economic integration affects the impact of profit sharing on the em-
ployment. It specifies a theoretical framework for empirical analysis. Section 3 set up
the econometric model. The data is described in Section 4. Section 5 presents the esti-
mation strategy, and reports on the empirical results. A few concluding remarks are
given in the last section.
2  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
We will structure a general theoretical model of intra-industry trade to capture the ef-
fects of product market integration1 on the impact of profit sharing on employment via
the removal of barriers. Intra-industry trade may be defined as the two-way exchange of
goods in which neither country seems to have a comparative cost advantage. We sup-
5pose that labour markets are unionized which generates rigidities in the wage setting
process. As Koskela and Stenbacka (2005) emphasize, the profit sharing decisions take
place within the framework of an institutional environment where the profit-sharing
schemes have to be independent of wage agreements. It is supposed that the firms
commit themselves to a profit sharing arrangement which specifies to what extent the
wage contracts are performance-related.2 The firm determines the employment, once the
base wage and the profit share have been determined. The wages serve as a commit-
ment, which the firm takes as given when it decides about profit sharing. We consider
an open economy where there are many firms at industry level producing differentiated
good with capital and labour as inputs. Supposing that product markets are imperfectly
competitive, there is monopolistic competition in good markets adapting the model of
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) where there is assumed to be no strategic (Bertrand or Cour-
not) interaction between firms.3 The structure of this general model is such that con-
sumers demand a variety of differentiated products.
Assuming that linear-homogenous technology can be represented for each firm i at
industry j by CES (constant elasticity of substitution)4 production function form, it can
be specified as
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and capital is denoted by jiK , and labour by jiL . The elasticity of substitution is defined
as the effect of a change in relative factor prices on relative inputs of these two factors,
1 An integration process is implying more integration across product markets.
2 It is crucial that firms feel able to reduce average total remuneration. If firms feel that they must con-
tinue to pay the same amount to each worker as in the existing wage system, introducing profit sharing
will not alter hiring behavior. Then, as Wadhwani and Wall (1990) argue, if firms feel committed to pay-
ing a certain total amount, the manner in which this amount was divided into the two components (base
wage and profit linked pay), would become irrelevant.
3 This approximates a situation in which there are a large number of varieties and each firm has some
power over the pricing of its product.
4 The CES function exhibits constant returns to scale. However, trade may give rise to take advantage of
economies of scale in production.
6holding output constant (see Allen 1938, or Hamermesh 1993). It can be thought as pa-
rameterized on trade costs ( jt ) to reflect that integration expands the set of factors by
increasing mobility of capital. Thus, firms can substitute other factors of production for
immobile workers more easily by investing. If the elasticity of substitution is great, as
labour costs rises relative to capital costs, labour will be substituted for capital.5
We suppose for simplicity that all industries produce only differentiated products.6
The firms face at industry j representative consumer’s tastes which are assumed repre-
sented by the utility function
(2.2) jj
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where ji
n
ij DD 1=S=  is an index of consumption of the differentiated products at industry
j, and jb is the positive constant. Firm i at industry j is assumed to choose the price and
decide on employment so as maximize the following profit function
(2.3) [ ]jijijijijijijiwjijiwji KrLwYYp --P-=PP- )()1()1( .
where jip  represents the price of variety i, and capital costs are denoted by jir . The firm
takes the wage rate jiw  and the profit share
w
jiP  as given. The profit share determines
what fraction of the firms' profits will be transferred to employed workers. From the
underlying utility function, given by (2.2), by imposing the symmetry assumption a
consumer maximizing7 will set the demand in the product market as
5 When there is a rise in the labour costs, the relative price of capital in terms of labour in this industry
will decline i.e. capital here will be relatively cheap. As a result competitive forces will lead to the adop-
tion of more capital-intensive production. In case of a unitary elasticity of substitution, the capital/labour
ratio will also change by equal percentages as the factor-price ratio. If the elasticity of substitution is less
than one, an increase in the price of labour must induce firms to use more capital, but the increase in the
use of capital is not equal relative to an increase in the labour-price.
6 It is possible to suppose that there is a sector producing the outside good only for domestic market.
7 Each consumer maximises their utility function (2.1) subject to the budget constraint. The budget con-
straint simply requires that the value of expenditure is not more than value of the income.
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e  is the product-demand elasticity, and *jP   represents an index of
the price level in terms of international integration. The product-demand elasticity can
be thought as an increasing function of the number of products ( )jjj nee = , where
( ) 0>¢ jj ne , and jn  is the number of products/firms at industry j. An increase in the
number of firms leads to an increase in the degree of competition. The demand of prod-
ucts type i is given as
(2.5)
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where jip  represents the price of variety i with 1>jf  denoting the elasticity of substitu-
tion between any two products types (see Helpman and Krugman 1989).8 The industry’s
elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods can be thought as a decreasing
function of the advantage of economies of scale ( )jjj aff = , where ( ) 0<¢ jj af , and
*
j
j
j A
A
a º  is an exogenous comparative productivity for domestic industry relative to
foreign. A growth in the advantage of economies of scale in industry leads to a decrease
in the degree of substitution among differentiated goods within industry.9 From utility
maximizing of consumer and using (2.5), we have
8 Tefler (1995) discussed that when consumers regard home and foreign product varieties as imperfect
substitutes, the overall industry product-demand elasticity depends on the elasticity of substitution be-
tween home and foreign varieties.
9 Together with interaction between number of products/firms and degree of price competition, intra-
industry trade and economic integration can be seen as the result of the interaction between product dif-
ferentiation and economies of scale. Each industry contains a large, but limited because of economies of
scale, number of potential differentiated products that consumers regard as imperfect substitutes. Given
8(2.6) jjj jjijji PpaD
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That is, demand for any product type depends on both its own price in terms of the other
product and on the overall price index in terms of that product. So long as je < jf , i.e.
the elasticity of substitution within the industry is larger than the price elasticity, the
demand for an individual product will depend positively on the overall price index.
Consider now the impact of a reduction in marginal trade costs on product markets.
Let jt  denotes a trade cost due to transactions costs and other trade barriers related to
foreign trade10 at industry j. The effects on imperfectly competitive product markets of
increased integration via declining trade costs are basically of two counteracting sorts.
Hence, it turns out to vary competition by varying both advantage of economies of scale
holding je  constant, and number of firms holding jf  constant. First, individual produc-
ers with access to the wider market were expected to be able to expand production to
take better advantage of economies of scale ( ja ). This has associated to reduced market
imperfection and to increased incentive of product-differentiating. Hence, we assume
that
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Second, market entry becomes easier and/or less costly implying that more goods be-
come traded goods ( jn ). With increased integration and competition, an industry’s mar-
ket share becomes increasingly sensitive to price changes raising the elasticity of the
consumption price. Thus, we have
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the opportunity to trade, industries will specialize in the production of different ranges, while the degree
of price competition will increase.
10 For simplicity, we assume that the trade costs of import and export outputs are equal.
9The higher the degree of price competition is, i.e., the closer substitutes the good sale on
the world market is, the more elastic with respect to own price output demand becomes.
On the other hand, if the initial competitiveness of domestic industry is much better than
the competitiveness of foreign industry, an increase in the degree of competition tends
to give rise to a higher supply taking better advantage of economies of scale.
The relative price *
j
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p
 chosen by the firm. In the imperfect competition, we have
then the condition of pricing rule for products types at industry j
(2.9)
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A given variety i within industry j is offered by firms at a price jip  in terms of the over-
all price index *jP , in terms of various trade costs jt  related to foreign trade at industry
j, and in terms of the comparative productivity of domestic industry relative to foreign
ja . In optimum, the price equals to the marginal revenue from exporting, where we
must have that relative trade cost equals to mark-up factor i.e.
1
1
-+
+
=
+
jj
jj
j
j
a ef
eft
 (see,
e.g., Helpman and Krugman 1989, p. 18). We summarize the characterization of the
optimal pricing rule in
Proposition  1 Lower trade costs with increased integration, higher number of firms
and in consequence of its higher elasticity of product demand will reduce the mark-up
price, whereas better advantage of economies of scale and in consequence of its lower
elasticity of substitution between differentiated products will raise it, ceteris paribus.
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Using (2.6) under utility maximization of an individual consumer i.e., set marginal
utility equal to marginal cost, each single firm i at industry j faces a downward sloping
demand curve
(2.10) )()( jjjijijiji ppDY
ef +-== .
The closer substitutes for output jiY on the international market are, the more elastic
output demand becomes.11 Profit maximization implies that the firms will set a price,
which exceeds the marginal cost by a constant mark-up factor, i.e. using (2.9) we have,
in optimum, 1
1
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. In a process of integration, there are pressures for
the mark-ups to decline with increasing elasticity of product demand.12 On the other
hand, a decrease in the product-substitution elasticity may compensate this effect. For
example, Bottasso and Sembenelli (2001) conclude using Italian firm level data that EU
Single Market Program has lead to a decrease in the mark-up and an increase in produc-
tivity for those firms that were expected, ex-ante, to be more sensitive to the abolition of
external trade barriers.13
Determining the implicit form of labour demand, the conditional labour costs can be
derived from (2.1) as
(2.11)
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11 Applying one of the four Hicks-Marshall laws of derived demand, the demand for anything is likely to
be more elastic, the more elastic is the demand for any further thing, which it contributes to produce
(Hicks 1966, p. 242).
12 Whenever an economy faces a larger number of firms in an integrated world market, trade itself leads
to a decline in the mark-ups. Hence, the degree of competition tends to increase when more goods be-
come traded. By increasing competition facing individual firms in product markets, it is intended that
firms should lower their mark-ups of prices over marginal costs. For instance, Hoon (2001) has affirmed
that as domestic and foreign firms compete in the markets for traded goods, there are pressures for the
mark-ups to decline.
13 Overall, these results are consistent with the long standing view that economic integration reduces
firms' market power and increases productivity via the removal of trade barriers.
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Similarly, it can be derived for capital costs, jir . Under the assumption of wage taking
and profit maximizing behaviour labour demand can be written by using equations
(2.10) and (2.11)
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Differentiating (2.12) with respect to the wages gives
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Firms decide on employment to maximize profits for given wage rate and profit share,
constrained by both the elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods and the
elasticity of demand in their product market
(2.14) [ ]jijijj jijijijiwjijiwji rwpp ssef ---- --P-=PP- 11)1()1( .
Differentiating (2.14) with respect to the wages gives
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Determining the wages and the profit share, the labour market is assumed to be im-
perfectly competitive. It is commonly accepted that the monopoly union model in a
simple way (see, e.g., Booth 1995) captures the qualitative implications of different la-
bour market models at least in respect to generate unemployment, and in the wage re-
sponse to the degree of centralization. The base wage is determined by trade union un-
der circumstances where the profit share wjiP  is given. It is supposed that the firms
commit themselves to a profit sharing arrangement which specifies to what extent the
wage contracts are performance-related. The profit sharing decision is made in anticipa-
12
tion of its effects on the base wage and labour demand. Each monopoly union maxi-
mizes the income of their members subject to the labour demand function (2.12), and
constrained by both the elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods and the
elasticity of demand in the product market. Let jiN  be the labour force for each firm i at
industry j, and thus [ ]jiji LN -  is unemployment. Union’s utility function is given by
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where the first term captures the rent to the employed at industry j, and jis  captures the
the outside option i.e., benefits for unemployed union member. Some authors (see, es-
pecially, Weitzman (1987) and Jackman (1988)) have argued that, in models where the
unions keep wages above market-clearing levels, the introduction of profit sharing may
reduce unemployment. This will occur essentially because a given reduction in the base
wage leads to a less than one-to-one reduction in total remuneration. So, provided that
employers look only at the base wage in setting employment, the trade-off between em-
ployment and wages has become more favourable to employment. Using implicit form
of labour demand (2.12) the elasticity of labour demand with wages can be written as
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That is, the elasticity of labour demand is equal to the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labour jis . The higher the elasticity of substitution, the more elastic is la-
bour demand.
Maximization of (2.16) with respect to wage rate yields an equation for the equilib-
rium wages
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According to (2.18) the wage rate is proportional to the outside option. We can see that
the integration of product market has no direct effect on the base wage. However, the
product market integration affects the wage through three indirect mechanisms, namely
via the profit share, the elasticity of labour demand with own price, and the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labour. By using (2.8), if product markets are imper-
fectly competitive, integration can make product markets more competitive via interna-
tional trade. Several models of imperfect competition predict that trade liberalization
makes demand more elastic, but not infinitely so.14 The market shares of a domestic
supplier and a foreign supplier become more sensitive to the relative price, when indus-
try is more integrated. International integration reducing trade frictions and therefore
making it easier to shift supplier can have potentially large effects on product-
elasticities. On the contrary, by using (2.7),  individual industry with access to the wider
market might be able to expand sales and production taking better advantage of econo-
mies scale which can be associated to decreased elasticities of product substitution.  It is
important to emphasize, as Koskela and Stenbacka (2005) argue, that there is no direct
effect of profit sharing on the wage elasticity of labour demand because profit sharing
operates like a non-distortionary profit tax. We can conclude that an increased elasticity
of labour demand will have a wage-moderating effect:
(2.19) 0<
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Since the demand for labour is a derived demand, which varies proportionately with the
elasticity of demand for goods, the intensified product market competition alone makes
14 In a perfectly competitive international market the output price decreases as the demand decreases, and
firms take the market price of output as given. Supposing decreasing returns to scale, each firm decreases
labour demand to the level where price equal marginal cost (see, e.g., Varian 1992, pp. 215-216). The
models of international trade (e.g., Heckscher-Ohlin model) with perfectly-competitive product markets
have the extreme result of infinitely-elastic product demand and thus infinitely-elastic labour demand.
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the demand for labour more elastic because of declining mark-ups.15 Intuitively, in-
creased product market competition makes it harder for the firms to survive with higher
wages and thus makes the firms’ employment decisions more sensitive to changes in the
wage rate. Then, with heightened foreign competition the unions face more elastic la-
bour demand relation and thus moderate their wage demands. For example, Huizinga
(1993), and Danthine and Hunt (1994) find that the creation of firm level competition
increases the elasticity of labour demand which moderates union’s wage demand i.e.,
increased goods market competition leads lower wages and then higher employment.
However, the effect of integration on the price sensitivity of the market share may be
compensated by its direct effect on the market share i.e., market power can arise from
specialization in production and differentiation of products being able to take better ad-
vantage of economies scale with segmented markets. Nickell et al. (1994), and Stewart
(1990) find evidence of a positive (time series) relationship between wages and market
power. This suggests that the sharing of mark-ups and of higher wages being associated
with market share. From (2.18) we can directly observe that an increased profit share
w
jiP  will have a wage-moderating effect:
(2.20) 0<
P¶
¶
w
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We can suppose that intensified product market competition increases the firm's incen-
tives to use profit sharing. This is because with perfect competition in the product mar-
ket the wage elasticity of labour demand is very high and thereby wage moderation can
be achieved with introducing the profit sharing. While, market power can arise from
specialization in production and differentiation of products being able to take better ad-
vantage of economies scale with segmented markets which reduces the firm's incentives
to use profit sharing with higher wage rate.16 These findings are summarized in
15 Applying one of the four Hicks-Marshall laws of derived demand, the demand for anything is likely to
be more elastic, the more elastic is the demand for any further thing, which it contributes to produce
(Hicks 1966, p. 242).
16 Nickell (1999) finds some evidence that sharing of monopoly rents leads to higher wages in the pres-
ence of market power in the product market.
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Proposition  2 Lower trade costs with increased integration, higher number of firms
and in consequence of its higher elasticity of product demand ( 0<
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crease the elasticity of labour demand ( 0>
¶
¶
j
ji
e
h
) and increase incentives for using
profit sharing ( 0<
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advantage of economies of scale and in consequence of its lower elasticity of substitu-
tion between differentiated products ( 0>
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) and decrease incentives for using profit sharing ( 0<
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Given the equilibrium wage rate (2.18), we have employment equation by using la-
bour demand (2.12)
(2.21)
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As expected, the employment depends negatively on the unemployment benefits jis .
The number of firms (both domestic and foreign) competing in this industry can arise as
a result of integration process, which shifts the foreign output mix towards this industry.
An integration process can force domestic firms to face heightened foreign competition.
We see that an increase in the elasticity of product demand triggered by more firms (i.e.,
je  rises) decreases firm's labour demand ( 0<¶
¶
j
jiL
e
). Product demand becomes more
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price elastic when product markets are more integrated, but is the effect of product mar-
ket integration on the price sensitivity of the market share larger than its direct effect on
the market share. In consequence of decreased trade costs product substitution becomes
less elastic (i.e., jf  falls) which can be associated to better advantage of economies
scale and thus increased firm's labour demand ( 0<
¶
¶
j
jiL
f
). Because of these counteract-
ing effects we cannot conclude that the scale effects of integration tend to decrease the
labour demand. We summarize these findings in
Proposition  3 Lower trade costs with increased integration, higher number of firms
and in consequence of its higher elasticity of product demand will decrease labour de-
mand, whereas better advantage of economies of scale and in consequence of its lower
elasticity of substitution between differentiated products will increase it.
By using (2.19), when the unions face more elastic labour demand relation and thus
moderate their wage demands, we find that increased labour-demand elasticity increase
labour demand due to the reduced market power of unions:
(2.22) 0>
¶
¶
ji
jiL
h
.
It is perfectly plausible that in firms where wages are bargained collectively, an increase
in product market competition will tend to lower wages17 and raise employment in the
presence of profit sharing.18 From (2.21) we can directly observe that an increased profit
share will increase employment:
17 Abowd and Lemieux (1993) has studied how product market conditions affect wages through their
effects on the financial strength of the firm by using data from collective agreements in Canada and they
show that higher foreign competition reduces wages.
18 Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Spector (2004) have developed a monopolistic competition model
with collective wage bargaining, but not with profit sharing, to study the effects of product market com-
17
(2.23) 0>
P¶
¶
w
ji
jiL .
We can conclude that the effects of economic integration on the impact of profit sharing
on employment depend definitely on trade-off between intensified competition and bet-
ter advantage of economies of scale. If product market competition increases, the possi-
bilities of profit sharing to improve employment through economic integration increase
with moderated wages. While, the economic integration associating with market power
in turn decreases the possibilities of profit sharing with higher wages to improve em-
ployment. As increased trade competition crowds out better advantage of economies of
scale, economic integration increases profit sharing with wage-moderating and thus
improve labour demand. We summarize the characterization of the scale effects of eco-
nomic integration on the impact on the profit sharing on employment in
Proposition  4 As increased trade competition crowds out better advantage of econo-
mies of scale,
j
j
j
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, and the elasticity of labour demand increases,
j
ji
f
h
¶
¶
<
j
ji
e
h
¶
¶
, the process of economic integration increases incentives for using profit
sharing ( 0<
P¶
¶
w
ji
jiw ) and decreases wages pressure ( 0<
¶
¶
ji
jiw
h
) which improves employ-
ment ( 0>
P¶
¶
w
ji
jiL ).
The process of integration reduces the trade barriers, and therefore leads to not only
more trade, but also more foreign investment. Increased investment opportunities make
firms more sensitive to changes in such costs. In the process of integration international
trade can increase the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital. As Rodrik
petition under imperfectly competitive labour markets and argued that higher product market competition
will increase employment.
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and van Ypersele (2001) explain, in the process of integration real and financial capital
are more sensitive to respond to shocks such as changes in productivity or the terms of
trade. A negative shock at home may induce a capital outflow abroad. A capital outflow
is also liable to affect the marginal productivity of labour, in turn leading to effects on
the wages (see, e.g., Keen and Marchand, 1997). From (2.17) we can directly observe
that the higher the elasticity of substitution, the more elastic is labour demand. This im-
plies that increased elasticity of substitution between labour and capital increases incen-
tives for using profit sharing with lower labour price which increases labour demand.
Particularly in production with low-skill workers employers can react sensitively to
changes in prevailing wages by investing.19 Thus, creating wage compression by union
encourage firms to invest in technologies increasing the productivity of less-skilled
workers. We find that in consequence of decreased trade costs as substitutability in-
creases (i.e. 0>
¶
¶
j
ji
t
s
)  labour demand increases:
(2.21) 0>
¶
¶
ji
jiL
s
.
On the contrary, the shifts in the production technology or an increase in the use of
physical capital have also required that workers acquire new skills which increase the
demand for human capital (i.e. 0<
¶
¶
j
ji
t
s
) and thus decrease the elasticity of substitution
between labour and capital. This suggests that decreased incentives to use profit sharing
with higher labour price depreciates labour demand. We summarize the substitution
effect of integration on the impact on the profit sharing on employment in
19 In the case of labour demand with several inputs, adopting more capital-intensive production will de-
crease the demand for low-skilled workers and increase the demand for educated workers. Then, a rise in
the cost to employers of using the physical capital will decrease the demand of educated workers used at
each level of production. In case of complements, the elasticity of substitution is low so that a rise in the
price of capital also leads to a decrease in employment.
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Proposition  5 Lower trade costs with increased integration, higher elasticity of substi-
tution between labour and capital ( 0>
¶
¶
j
ji
t
s
) will increase incentives for using profit
sharing ( 0<
P¶
¶
w
ji
jiw ) and decrease wages ( 0<
¶
¶
ji
jiw
s
) which increases labour demand
( 0>
¶
¶
ji
jiL
s
), whereas lower elasticity of substitution between labour and capital
( 0<
¶
¶
j
ji
t
s
) will decrease incentives using for profit sharing ( 0<
P¶
¶
w
ji
jiw ) and increase
wages ( 0<
¶
¶
ji
jiw
s
) which decreases labour demand ( 0>
¶
¶
ji
jiL
s
).
In summary, the effects of economic integration on the impact of profit sharing on
employment depend definitely on trade-off between intensified competition and better
advantage of economies of scale. If product market competition increases, the possibili-
ties of profit sharing to improve employment through economic integration increase
with moderated wages. While, the economic integration associating with market power
in turn decreases the possibilities of profit sharing with higher wages to improve em-
ployment. As increased trade competition crowds out better advantage of economies of
scale, economic integration increases profit sharing with wage-moderating and thus
improve labour demand. In addition, if elasticity of substitution between labour and
capital increases in the process of integration, incentives using profit sharing increases
with lower labour price which increases labour demand.
3  ECONOMETRIC MODEL
In empirical work, the strategy is to follow our theoretical framework in Section 2 as a
basis for econometric identification using the equilibrium condition for employment.
We estimate an employment equation, and attempt to evaluate whether economic inte-
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gration has changed the effects of profit sharing on the employment. To understand the
effects of profit-sharing, a useful method is to compare profit-sharing (PS) with non-
profit-sharing (NPS) firms. Taking a log-linear approximation of equation (2.18) em-
ployment20 can be written as a regression function:
(3.1)
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where i indexes firms, j the industry, and t the year. L is quantity of labour employed,
skill ratio of skilled workers to total employment, w real labour costs, wp  ratio of profit-
sharing payment to wages, and a  denotes a firm-specific fixed effect. We tried to im-
prove the estimated model by adding skilled workers ratio in order to take into account
labour qualification. It is assumed, in generally, that the share of high-skill workers em-
ployers with higher labour price has negative impact on the total employment. For scale
effects of real output, we use two different variables: the share of Finland’s exports to
the EU-countries in production (x) and the share of the output of European Union in
production ( *y ). The first attempts to measure foreign demand for firm’s products, and
the second attempts to measure the overall demand of European Union. Furthermore,
measuring the international product market competition, we use a real competitiveness
indicator ( *p ) where euro-country weights are based on Finland’s bilateral exports. For
substitution effects, we use two different variables: the share of Finland’s imports from
EU-countries in production (m) and the share of the investment of EU-countries to Fin-
land in domestic investment ( *fdi ). The first attempts to measure foreign intermediate
input outsourcing, and the second attempts to measure overall substitution between la-
bour and investment.
There is an issue that deserves some discussion here. It is that profit-sharing firms
might exhibit greater employment stability - this effect might derive either from Weitz-
man´s model where such firms are in a short-run ‘excess demand for labour’ regime, or
20 Taking logarithms in conditional labour demand, equation (2.18) yields to the form which is very use-
ful for estimation.
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from the possibility that profit-sharing will cause remuneration to adjust more quickly to
international shocks. We may test for this effect by examining to the response of em-
ployment to international shocks by differencing. The scale effects  measure the impact
of international demand shocks on labour demand. These estimates test whether the
responsiveness of profit-sharing firms to the demand shocks differs from the respon-
siveness of non-profit-sharing firms. A smaller employment fluctuation requires that the
coefficients on the change in industry output be smaller for profit-sharing firms.
4  DATA
The labour demand is estimated using assembled panel data from the manufacturing
sector based on a diversity of sources: the surveys of the Confederation of Finnish In-
dustries and Employers, the Longitudinal Database on Plants in Finnish Manufacturing
(LDPM) of Statistics Finland, the Financial Market Statistics of Bank of Finland, the
Foreign Trade Statistics of National Board of Customs, and the Industrial Structure Sta-
tistics of OECD STAN Database.21 The panel data covers period from 1996 to 2004.
The data from the Confederation of Finnish Industries and Employers includes individ-
ual level observations which is linked to the data of the respective firms. This survey
gives information, at the firm level, about the number of employees, base wages, bonus
payments on the profit-sharing basis22, and worker's individual qualifications like edu-
cation. The datasets used for our analysis consist of two panels: the first sample (PS)
concerns 981 profit-sharing firms, and the second sample (NPS) concerns 115 non-
profit-sharing firms. Each firm of the first sample was engaged in a profit-sharing
agreement for at least one year. Demand estimation requires measures of employment,
real labour prices, real investment and real output for all firm-year observations. The
LDPM panel includes annual data for manufacturing plants covering variables as pro-
duction, investment, the price indices for production and investment, employment (pro-
21 The manufacturing industries are included by the standard ISIC classification, excluding petroleum,
energy, and quarrying.
22 The profit-relating payments are determined here as performance-related payments which not include
benefits in kind, supplements for shift and earnings for overtime hours.
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duction and non-production workers), and nominal wages and employer social security
payments for production and non-production workers. The labour demand is supposed
to depend on the labour costs negatively. Employment comes directly from the data set
as the number of production and non-production workers. For total employment we
construct real labour costs as nominal annual wages and social security payments de-
flated by the producer price index and divided by the number of workers.
The ideal data here would be firm-level data because firms are the relevant units that
actually demand factors. However, plant-level data sets do not contain firm-level trade-
prices and all measurements of foreign demand (supply) for firm-level products (non-
labour inputs), so the next best alternative for these integration measurements is using
industry-level (2-digit ISIC manufacturing industries) data. We construct a real com-
petitiveness indicator of the industry relevant to ith firm as nominal competitiveness
indicator multiplied by terms of trade ratio of export and import prices. The constructed
nominal competitiveness indicator for the period 1996 - 2004 is based on Financial
Market Statistics maintained by Bank of Finland.  The industrial prices of exports and
imports are based on Producer Price Indices of Statistics Finland. An increase in the real
competitiveness indicator means that an industry’s price competitive ability decrease
which is supposed to decrease the product demand and thus the labour demand. We
construct two different variables for scale effects of real output: the share of firm’s ex-
ports to the EU-countries in production at firm level and the share of the industrial out-
put of European Union in industrial firms' production. Firm's exports to the EU-
countries are based on Foreign Trade Statistics maintained by National Board of Cus-
toms. Another variable, the production of European Union for each industry relevant to
ith firm is based on OECD Industrial Structure Statistics. In theory, the labour demand
is supposed to depend on the production positively. If product demand rises and thus
production increases, the firms’ demand for factors rises. The assumption is that higher
export signals better scale economies (or less foreign competition).23 A rise in exports
increases the production of industry, which is supposed to increase the labour demand.
On the other hand, the more the rest of the EU accounts for the output of industry, the
more competitive that industry is for domestic firms. We construct two different vari-
23
ables for substitution effects: the share of firm’s imports from EU-countries in produc-
tion at firm level and the share of the industrial investment of EU-countries to Finland
in industrial firms' investment. Firm's imports from the EU-countries are based on For-
eign Trade Statistics maintained by National Board of Customs. Another variable, for-
eign direct investment for each industry relevant to ith firm is based on Financial Mar-
ket Statistics of Bank of Finland. If demand for the non-labour inputs were to increase
induced by increased demand of outputs and thus production level, this effect would
increase the labour demand. While, foreign outsourcing and/or international investment
provides an alternative to many production-intensive firms and thus decreases depend-
ence on production labour, but also increases reliance on human capital and thus non-
production labour.24 Then, it is supposed that increased foreign outsourcing and/or in-
ternational investment decrease, especially, the demand of production labour.
Table 4.1 Variable summary statistics.
Profit-sharing firms
Variable  Mean      Std. Dev.      Min            Max
Number of total workers (logarithm)  4.920        1.213         0.000         10.06
Skilled workers ratio  0.357        0.232         0.000         1.000
Real labour price (logarithm)  3.557        0.273        -1.670         7.610
Profit-sharing ratio  0.011        0.021         0.000         0.387
Competitiveness index (real)  0.935        0.105         0.702         1.414
Exports ratio (real)  0.194        0.272         0.000         6.662
EU-output share (real) 76750       60165          7732        323430
Imports ratio (real)  525.4        3788          0.000        159793
EU-investment share (real)  374.2        383.7         1.273         1463
Non-profit-sharing firms
Variable  Mean      Std. Dev.      Min            Max
Number of total workers (logarithm)  4.314        0.853         2.708         7.090
Skilled workers ratio  0.259        0.156         0.000         1.000
Real labour price (logarithm)  3.383        0.243         2.468         4.248
Competitiveness index (real)  0.935        0.105         0.702         1.414
Exports ratio (real)  0.157        0.210         0.000         1.002
EU-output share (real) 113622     78459          7732        323430
Imports ratio (real)  1073         4720          0.000         57124
EU-investment share (real)  361.5        422.9         1.273         1463
23 Péridy (2004) finds using data of four EU countries over the period 1975 - 2000 that exports unambi-
guously rise with the degree of scale economies.
24 Empirical studies reviewed by Hamermesh (1993), usually point to a lower degree of substitution be-
tween skilled labour and capital than between unskilled labour and capital (see, e.g., Griliches 1969,
Bergström and Panas 1992, Biscourp and Gianella 2001).
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Table 4.1 reports summary statistics of the observations. PS firms, which are larger
than NPS firms, perform better in international product market as regards the level of
exports ratio and EU-output share. This different characteristic between PS firms and
NPS firms allows us to think that profit-sharing firms are more under international com-
petitiveness pressure with access to the wider product market while NPS firms are more
closed of economic integration. One important feature is that the level of labour costs is
higher in PS firms which indicates higher skilled workers ratio than in NPS firms. Thus,
we can not conclude whether there is substitution between the base wage and the profit
share.25 Furthermore, the better international performances of PS firms does not mean
that profit-sharing caused them. To explore the issue of profit-sharing effects, there oc-
curs simultaneity bias due to the fact that profit-sharing payments may be the outcome
as well as the cause of better performance in international product market. Let us under-
score that we do not consider the effect of profit-sharing on international performance.
We will concentrate our econometric work on the aim of determining the effect of eco-
nomic integration on the impact of profit sharing on the employment.
5  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The empirical study of the effects of profit sharing has typically focused on its impact
on productivity and employment through productivity effects. Cahuc and Dormont
(1997) evaluate the consequences on productivity and employment of the large increase
in profit-sharing in France. Their datasets used for this analysis consist of two panels of
profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing manufacturing firms observed over the period
1986-1989. Estimation of employment equation in levels and growth rates shows that
profit-sharing has ambiguous effects on employment. Kruse (1991) tests an implication
of Weitzman's profit-sharing theory that profit-sharing firms will have more stable em-
ployment than fixed-wage firms using panel data on manufacturing firms for the years
1971-1985. Adapting a dynamic labour demand framework for the U.S., results suggest
25 The most convincing result would be obtained from the estimation of a wage equation (see Wadhwani
and Wall 1990). However, we had no appropriate variable to carry out this regression i.e., we have no
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that the statistical association between aggregate unemployment and employment at the
firm level is less strong for profit-sharing firms. Wadhwani and Wall (1990) present a
more formal test of this proposition in the context of a labour demand model. However,
using british micro datasets over the period 1972-1982, they find no difference in the
effect of aggregate demand shocks on employment between profit-sharing and non-
profit-sharing firms. In contrast to these work, this study is the first to determine the
effects of economic integration on the impact of profit-sharing on the employment using
data from the Finnish manufacturing sector.26
5.1  Estimation strategy
There are some issues to mention regarding the estimation strategy. One is the exogene-
ity of the regressors in the employment equation. As Hamermesh (1986) discusses,
some of them might actually be endogenous variables. Quandt and Roser (1989) esti-
mated an equilibrium model of the labour market, and used it to test the assumption of
production exogeneity. They did not reject the assumption that production is exogenous.
Furthermore, for the possibility of endogeneity of investment the presence of capital
market imperfections suggests that firms will find it difficult to adjust investment
quickly in response to exogenous shocks that may influence employment decisions.27 If
some regressors are endogenous, then least-squares parameter estimates will suffer en-
dogeneity bias, the net direction of which is not clear.
A panel sample offers a number of possibilities for structuring and handling the data,
which leads to various types of estimators. In the case of a standard linear regression
model, if it is well specified, the various estimators should all be consistent. Conversely,
the differences of various estimators, when significant, imply some sort of specification
error, and this can provide formal specification tests (Hausman and Taylor 1979).
Therefore, a useful tack is to present the results of within-firm estimates relying on the
information about the union density or the unemployment benefits.
26 Kauhanen and Piekkola (2002) and Snellman et al. (2003) have examined the effects of profit sharing
on earnings and productivity using Finnish linked employer-employee data. Their results suggest that
profit-sharing has positive effects on productivity.
27 Capital stock is estimated as the real value of machinery, equipment, transportation equipment, build-
ings and structures.
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deviations to the firm means and first-difference estimates using the yearly growth rates.
The most usual transformation applied to panel data is that variables are in logs of lev-
els.
A third issue is, as usual on micro data, that our variables suffer from measurement
errors, because we have no information, at the firm level, on factor utilization rates,
hours of work and prices. But the main difficulty stems from the lack of an estimate of
capital average age at the microeconomic level. Therefore, it was difficult to adjust ac-
curately the capital stock for inflation. This measurement problem does not seriously
affect the estimates when they are carried out on the levels of the production variables
of firm i at year t. In this case, as Cahuc and Dormont (1997) argue, the variance due to
differences between firms is largely predominant, and much greater than the variance
due to measurement errors of this kind. This is no longer true, as Griliches and Haus-
man (1986) argue, when regressions use first differences which give more importance to
´noises´ due to measurement errors. Taking time differences also controls for unob-
served time-invariant industry fixed effects influencing the labour-demand level. How-
ever, time-differencing can also aggravate regressor measurement error and result in
inconsistent estimates. Hsiao (1986) argues that if variables are indeed subject to meas-
urement errors, exploiting panel data to control for the effects of unobserved individual
characteristics using standard differenced estimators may result in even more biased
estimates than simple ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators using cross-sectional data
alone. Thus, we first estimate the employment equation for the levels by OLS with fixed
effects including time dummies. Furthermore, to minimize inconsistency, Griliches and
Hausman (1986) suggest that the employment should be estimated using long differ-
ences. When the concern focuses on trends over time rather than levels, then the bias of
measurement might not influence decisively. However, our set of data has restricted
sample size both of in the cross-section dimension and time dimension. One limitation
of the data is the short period covered by the profit sharing survey. Taking into account
our data restrictions we did not take longer differences. In fact, we proceed with the
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation, which provides a convenient
framework for obtaining consistent and at least asymptotically efficient estimators for
the dynamic panel data (Bond, 2002). More specifically, the equations (3.1) were esti-
mated using the first-differenced GMM method developed by Arellano and Bond
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(1991). This method estimates the model in first differences but uses the lagged vari-
ables in levels as instruments.
A fourth issue is that the profit sharing survey data tell only profit shares paid out. It
does not show the firms that have a profit sharing plan, but have not paid profit shares,
as the goals have not been achieved. This is very likely to influence the estimates.
5.2  Estimation results
In the first instance, we limit the presentation of our results to regressions performed on
the profit-sharing sample with and without the effects of economic integration. Every
firm of PS sample does not operate a profit-sharing scheme each year of the period.
Thus, the number of NPS firms fell to 115 owing any profit-sharing observation during
our period. We notice that NPS firms produce more for the domestic market with higher
import penetration, while PS firms produce more for export competing markets. Be-
cause of slight performance in international product market for non-profit-sharing sam-
ple, we also estimate specification including the interaction term with profit sharing for
total sample of PS and NPS firms. We add a profit-sharing dummy variable for firms
that had at least one of the profit-sharing schemes to the equation, and interact it with
economic integration measures. The estimations have been carried out with and without
the variable skill. We present here the results with skilled workers ratio, which do not
differ from the results obtained without this variable.
Our estimated labour demand without the effects of economic integration is pre-
sented in Table 5.1. And, the results with the effects of economic integration for em-
ployment function estimates are reported in Table 5.2. In first-difference estimates, we
allow for dynamics through a quite simple (given the short period available) partial ad-
justment mechanism. Moreover, the high dominance of between-firm differences in the
levels variability is concomitant with serious autocorrelations of variables and residuals.
This leads the estimates to be biased as soon as the model is specified in an autoregres-
sive pattern. Although, these estimates test whether the responsiveness of profit-sharing
firms to the demand shocks differs from the responsiveness of non-profit-sharing firms.
Determining the effect of economic integration on the impact of profit-sharing on the
28
employment, we keep the static form to estimate labour demand on levels, which is in
accordance with the cross-section feature of total regression.
Table 5.1  Regression results for employment on the profit-sharing sample without the effects
of economic integration
Notes: (1) The specification is
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where L log of quantity of labour employed, p w  profit-sharing payments/wages, w  log of ((base wage + employer
social security payments) / number of workers), p  implicit price index of production, y log of production, k log of
capital stock, and skill skilled workers / total employment. (2) Values of t-ratios are reported in parentheses. (3)
Column [1]: estimated by OLS with fixed effects including time dummies. (4) Column [2]: GMM refers to Arellano
and Bond (1991) dynamic panel data estimation method. (5) Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions. (6) Arel-
lano-Bond test for first and second order autocorrelation of the differenced errors.
Considering the results without the effects of economic integration in Table 5.1, the
estimated coefficients have, generally, the expected effects. The coefficients of produc-
tion and capital (on logs of levels) are significant and have the expected signs. As ex-
pected, the prices of production and labour have negative effect on labour demand. Al-
though, the coefficients of labour demand elasticity with own price are unexpected
large. These results are also unchanged when introducing a lagged value of the em-
ployment through the autoregressive specification. Considering on the profit-sharing
effect, we notice that these regressions lead to a non-significant effect of profit-sharing
on labour demand. This result is supportive of other findings on profit-sharing using
Method Fixed effects First-differences GMM
[1] [2]
Employment 0.200 (8.96)
Labour price -0.817 (-34.6) -0.851 (-35.0)
Profit-sharing 0.008 (0.05) -0.030 (-0.21)
Skilled workers -0.211 (-5.48) -0.072 (-1.59)
Price index -0.333 (-6.94) -0.397 (-6.73)
Production 0.671 (84.9) 0.585 (64.5)
Capital stock 0.057 (10.3) 0.073 (10.3)
Number of obs 5580 3896
R² (within) 0.774
F-test (p-value) 1148.96 (0.000)
Sargan test  (p-value) 59.23 (0.000)
AR(1) (0.000)
AR(2) (0.706)
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different samples and techniques (Cahuc and Dormont 1997, Wadhwani and Wall
1990).
Table 5.2  Regression results for employment on the profit-sharing sample with the effects of
economic integration
Notes: (1) The specification is
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where L log of quantity of labour employed, p w  profit-sharing payments/wages, w  log of ((base wage + employer
social security payments) / number of workers), p*  industry international price index, x firm's exports to EU-
countries / firm's production, y*  EU-countries' industry production / firm's industry production, m firm's imports
from EU-countries / firms' production, fdi*  EU- countries' industry foreign direct investment / firms' industry capi-
tal stock, and skill skilled workers / total employment. (2) Values of t-ratios are reported in parentheses. (3) Column
[1]: estimated by OLS with fixed effects including time dummies. (4) Column [2]: GMM refers to Arellano and Bond
(1991) dynamic panel data estimation method. (5) Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions. (6) Arellano-Bond test
for first and second order autocorrelation of the differenced errors.
With the effects of economic integration, the estimates seem in Table 5.2, generally,
plausible and well estimated. All the explanatory variables have the expected effect,
except the share of the foreign direct investment is not significant. As stressed above,
this non-significance may be viewed as the outcome of measurement errors which
mainly affects our investment variable. As, an integration process force firms to face
heightened foreign competition, we see that the negative coefficients measuring these
effects provide support that higher competition decreases the labour demand. Whereas,
Method Fixed effects First-differences GMM
[1] [2]
Employment 0.463 (10.9)
Labour price -0.444 (-13.8) -0.680 (-19.1)
Profit-sharing 1.666 (5.96) 0.210 (0.78)
Skilled workers -2.382 (-41.7) -1.618 (-21.9)
Competitiveness -0.117 (-1.69) -0.132 (-1.98)
Exports 0.155 (4.92) 0.066 (1.78)
EU-output -0.0001 (-1.83) -0.0001 (-2.39)
Imports -0.0001 (-3.38) -0.0001 (-4.10)
EU-investment -0.0001 (-1.46) -0.0001 (-1.36)
Number of obs 6595 4576
R² (within) 0.343
F-test (p-value) 182.79 (0.000)
Sargan test  (p-value) 70.73 (0.000)
AR(1) (0.000)
AR(2) (0.668)
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the positive coefficient associating with market power suggests that the economic inte-
gration associating better advantage of economies scale improve employment. The elas-
ticity of labour demand with own price is increased when first-differences are per-
formed. Turning to the profit-sharing effect the most noteworthy result is the positive
coefficient that we find whatever the estimate performed. Regression of column (1) on
levels shows that the estimated parameter equals 1.666. In comparison to the without
the effects of economic integration, these results on levels indicate that economic inte-
gration has positive and significant effect on the impact of profit-sharing on employ-
ment. However, the first-difference estimates lead to a non-significant positive effect of
profit-sharing on employment. Thus, we do not find that profit-sharing firms might ex-
hibit greater employment stability in the process of economic integration.
Table 5.3 we look at how the impact of increased profit sharing varies with economic
integration considering the interaction with foreign comparative advantage, price com-
petition and investing/outsourcing. All the explanatory variables have the expected ef-
fect, except the share of the foreign direct investment and competitiveness indicator are
not significant. These results on levels indicate that profit-sharing has positive and sig-
nificant effect on employment, while the first-difference estimates lead to a non-
significant positive effect. In our theory, weaker advantage of economies of scale will
increase incentives for using profit sharing and thus decrease wages which increase la-
bour demand. As the interactions between profit-sharing and foreign comparative ad-
vantage measures are negative and significant, the results on levels provide evidence
that an increase in profit sharing increases the employment less so in the presence of
favourable comparative advantage. However, the insignificant interaction coefficient
between profit-sharing and competitiveness does not reveal whether an increase in
profit sharing increases the employment more so in the presence of strong trade compe-
tition. In our theory, higher product market competition will increase incentives for us-
ing profit sharing and thus decrease wages which increase labour demand. As the inter-
action between profit-sharing and foreign outsourcing measure is negative and signifi-
cant, the result on levels indicate that an increase in profit sharing increases the em-
ployment less so in the presence of intensive outsourcing. While, the insignificant inter-
action coefficient between profit-sharing and investment indicate that profit sharing is
not associated with elasticity of substitution between labour and capital.
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For all the reasons stated above, we should believe in results relying on levels that
profit-sharing improves employment in the process of economic integration, although
there is no evidence that it contributes the stability of employment.
Table 5.3  Regression results for employment on the total sample with interaction effects
Notes: (1) PS-dummy=1 for profit-sharing firms. (2) Values of t-ratios are reported in parentheses. (3) Column [1]:
estimated by OLS with fixed effects including time dummies. (4) Column [2]: GMM refers to Arellano and Bond
(1991) dynamic panel data estimation method. (5) Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions. (6) Arellano-Bond test
for first and second order autocorrelation of the differenced errors.
6  CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study has been twofold to investigate the effects of the economic
integration on the impact of profit sharing on the employment by using theoretical
model and empirical analysis. We build the theoretical framework for estimating em-
ployment and determining the impact of economic integration on the effects of profit
Method Fixed effects First-differences GMM
[1] [2]
Employment 0.479 (11.3)
Labour price -0.449 (-15.1) -0.680 (-20.4)
Profit-sharing 3.186 (1.60) 1.893 (0.86)
Skilled workers -2.264 (-42.5) -1.537 (-22.5)
PS-dummy*Competitiveness 1.325 (0.65) -0.907 (-1.05)
PS-dummy*Exports -2.670 (-3.73) -0.761 (-0.39)
PS-dummy*EU-output -0.0001 (-1.75) -0.0001 (-1.14)
PS-dummy*Imports -0.0006 (-3.66) -0.0001 (-0.59)
PS-dummy*EU-investment 0.0002 (0.25) -0.0008 (-1.05)
Competitiveness -0.092 (-1.41) -0.111 (-1.75)
Exports 0.247 (6.62) 0.087 (2.22)
EU-output -0.0001 (-2.21) -0.0001 (-2.37)
Imports -0.0001 (-2.92) -0.0001 (-3.94)
EU-investment -0.0001 (-1.41) -0.0001 (-1.31)
Number of obs 7523 5259
R² (within) 0.329
F-test (p-value) 149.75 (0.000)
Sargan test  (p-value) 73.5 (0.000)
AR(1) (0.000)
AR(2) (0.656)
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sharing. In a general theoretical model of intra-industry trade, we analyzed how eco-
nomic integration changes the impact of profit sharing on employment. A model cap-
tures both effects running from product markets, the scale effects, as well as factor sub-
stitutions possibilities, the substitution effects, to the impact of profit sharing on labour
demand. We show that the scale effects of economic integration on the impact of profit
sharing on employment depend definitely trade-off between intensified competition and
better advantage of economies of scale. If product market competition increases, the
possibilities of profit sharing to improve employment through economic integration
increase with moderated wages. While, the economic integration associating with mar-
ket power in turn decreases the possibilities of profit sharing with higher wages to im-
prove employment. Our theoretical model suggests that, as increased trade competition
crowds out better advantage of economies of scale, economic integration increases
profit sharing with wage-moderating and thus improve labour demand. In addition, if
elasticity of substitution between labour and capital increases in the process of integra-
tion, incentives using profit sharing decreases with higher relative labour price which
decreases labour demand.
We structured the econometric model in which the aim is to determine whether
European integration has changed the impact of profit sharing on the employment in
Finland using data from the manufacturing sector from 1996 to 2004. Our finds provide
support that economic integration strengthen the positive impact of profit-sharing on the
employment. However, we do not find that profit-sharing firms might exhibit greater
employment stability in the process of economic integration. These results provide evi-
dence for the hypothesis that profit-sharing improves employment in the process of eco-
nomic integration, but can have ambiguous effects on the stability of employment.
Finally, the study points up potentially interesting area for future research. One area
for further research would be to extend the integration model to capture the effect of
profit-sharing on wage formation and thus on the structural unemployment. The most
convincing result would be obtained from the estimation of a wage equation determin-
ing whether there is substitution between the base wage and the profit sharing.
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